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- 2:02
Do not exist in physical space, not out there, in between, or in here. In other words, nowhere in physical space. And these appearances are in Buddhism, especially in Madhyamaka, in Dzogchen, they're called empty appearances. Appearance is empty. And we see that in the Heart Sūtra. Appearance is empty. Emptiness is form. Apart from emptiness, there is no form. Apart from form, there is no emptiness. So it's a really central theme.
- 6:04
That will go back to Angela's blouse. And that is, there's appearance of blue. And then we say, quite correctly, Angela's blouse is blue. Angelus Blouse is made of atoms. I mean, who can deny that? Somebody made it. And it's made of molecules, atoms. And does Angelus Blouse exist in physical space?
- 9:27
They even say Nang Xing Meba. The sweater appears, but it doesn't exist. Look for it, who's ever actually seen the sweater? The attribute bearer, that which is blue and has this texture and it has this taste and has this, has, has, has. Who's ever seen the haver?
- 39:06
Yes. By their own nature, were they simply discovered because they're already out there? No. Atoms, particles, fields, waves, they do exist relative to the mind that conceives them. And they have no existence whatsoever independent of the mind that conceives them. Just as colors have no existence whatsoever independent of visual perception, the colors that we see.
- 42:10
It's not out there. It's not out there in physical space. The basis of designation is appearances and they are not objective. They arise in the space of your mind and they're empty. They're empty of that which you're imputing upon it. And that is whether it's flesh, your flesh is empty of you. There's nobody there.
Transcript
0:10 So perhaps useful to give a brief preface to the next session. We're forging ahead again. I've mentioned in the past something that seems to me quite evidently true, could be wrong, and that is that all of the appearances to our senses, and that's all six of them, the visual, sounds and everything, including appearances of course to the mind, Report an error in the passage at 0:10
0:35 that all of these are immaterial and non-physical. They're immaterial because the colors we see are not made of atoms, they're not physical, they're not located in physical space. So I've discussed that, and so I won't really belabor that point, but I don't see how it can be not true. Report an error in the passage at 0:35
0:57 These appearances themselves, the colors that we see, philosophers call them qualia, the colors that we see, not sound waves or not photons, not electromagnetic fields, not molecules or atoms, But the sounds we hear, the colors we see, the dreams we experience and so forth, they're not out there in the physical world, they're not in between in the photons or in the sound waves, and there's just no evidence at all that they're inside the brain. Report an error in the passage at 0:57
1:23 It's kind of like basically a categorical error to have a physical space with chemicals in it and say, oh, by the way, there are dreams in there too. It's a categorical error. It just doesn't mean anything. It's like saying justice is inside a certain building. That's just a categorical area. You can't refute it. You can say, but that just doesn't make any sense. Report an error in the passage at 1:23
1:45 And this has kind of made a lot. So let's, if you will, take that as a working hypothesis that all the appearances to our six senses, everything we directly perceive, all consists of non-physical, immaterial appearances, which therefore, and quite evidently, Do not exist in physical space, not out there, in between, or in here. In other words, nowhere in physical space. And these appearances are in Buddhism, especially in Madhyamaka, in Dzogchen, they're called empty appearances. Report an error in the passage at 1:45
2:18 Appearance is empty. And we see that in the Heart Sūtra. Appearance is empty. Emptiness is form. Apart from emptiness, there is no form. Apart from form, there is no emptiness. So it's a really central theme. And the teaching is on perfection of wisdom, and it carries right through Mahamudra and Dzogchen. Report an error in the passage at 2:18
2:32 The appearances arise, but they're empty of anything other than just what appears, exactly like the reflection in a pool of water. It's there, you can photograph it, but is there something there, right where that reflection is, 20 feet below the surface of the water or what have you, is there something there that in any way corresponds to reflection? Report an error in the passage at 2:32
2:54 The answer is... That reflection of the trees on the far side of the pond is completely empty. There's nothing there. Even though that reflection does have causal efficacy, there's nothing there where that reflection is. It's kind of a powerful point. But now, of course, we don't generally walk around with the sense that we're just surrounded by and the whole world consists of empty appearances. Report an error in the passage at 2:54
3:17 We have a notion of physical space, which we don't see, because the space we do see Like the space between Angela and myself. So I have a sense of being over here and Angela's body over there, and I can see there's space between us, a good deal of it, right? And we can see it. There it is. It's transparent. It's clear. But that's not physical space. Because the appearance of, let's say, of Angela's blouse, which is kind of a dark blue, grayish blue, that appears to be over there, but it's not over there. Report an error in the passage at 3:17
3:46 Not over there as in over there in physical space because that color, again, is not in the fabric, it's not in the molecules, it's not in photons, it's not inside my brain either. So the appearance, the blue appearance of Angela's blouse over there appears to be over there, but it's not over there someplace in physical space. It's there in the substrate, it's in the space of my mind. Report an error in the passage at 3:46
4:07 But that means any space between the appearance of the blue of her blouse and where I sense I am over here, any... Space in between cannot possibly be physical space because the appearance itself is not in physical space, it's mental space. So the very notion of physical space is something conceptually designated but not directly perceived. It's not denying it. Report an error in the passage at 4:07
4:32 We're not saying there's no such thing as physical space. It's just that it's something conceptually designated, not something we directly observe. Report an error in the passage at 4:32
4:43 But now this next meditation, because I want to be short and get back to the text. We have a lot of territory to cover. The next meditation is going to be a prelude to the very next section of the text. And that is appearances arising, appearances arising, and they are simply what they are. The appearances themselves are nameless. Blue doesn't shout out, I'm blue. And the sound doesn't say, I'm a sound. They are nameless. Report an error in the passage at 4:43
5:05 They are inarticulate. They are simply appearances. But this next meditation will be as you simply rest in awareness and now open to, attentive to, all the appearances. So we haven't quite done this before. It's not selective now. We're not focusing on the space of the mind. We're not practicing non-meditation. We're going to just move right on through. And now really just open the awareness to all the appearances, to all this extorage. Report an error in the passage at 5:05
5:30 Just see what comes up, what comes up, what comes up. These appearances are not taking place in physical space. They do not have names or labels of their own that we simply discover somehow. Clearly they're simply projected upon them. But the practice will be, as you're resting in that stillness and observing appearances coming up, but also observing the activities of your mind. Report an error in the passage at 5:30
5:53 It's kind of a subtle practice and radically empirical. As you're observing the activities of your mind, observe the process of conceptual designation. That will go back to Angela's blouse. And that is, there's appearance of blue. Report an error in the passage at 5:53
6:11 And then we say, quite correctly, Angela's blouse is blue. Angelus Blouse is made of atoms. I mean, who can deny that? Somebody made it. And it's made of molecules, atoms. And does Angelus Blouse exist in physical space? Sure. Right over there. Right? Angelus Blouse is not a figma in my imagination. Angelus Blouse is not inside my substrate. Report an error in the passage at 6:11
6:39 Angelus Blouse is made of atoms. We're not denying that. It's never denied. In Bajiamaka or Dzogchen, Angelus Blouse is made of atoms and it's located in physical space. And we say it's blue. That's interesting. How can something that's physical and does exist in physical space have an attribute that is not physical and doesn't exist in physical space? Report an error in the passage at 6:39
7:01 Exactly how does that fit? Now, maybe it's a new blouse and it still has that fragrance of maybe wool, you know, kind of a fresh fabric. And you kind of say, oh yeah, I see you must have gotten it just recently, like a new car smell, a new sweater smell, right? Say, oh, your sweater has a nice fragrance to it. Report an error in the passage at 7:01
7:20 So now the fragrance, which is one more immaterial appearance, is now the fragrance of her blouse. She said, can I touch it? Can I see whether it's smooth or rough? She said, sure, touch it. It's kind of quite smooth. It has a nice texture. So now her blouse also has a smooth quality. Now I wouldn't really talk about tasting it, but that's conceivable. Report an error in the passage at 7:20
7:42 I really like your blouse because I just have a little nipple. Tastes very sheepy. You know, whatever. But it does have some kind of taste, and then we could say, hypothetically, oh, her blouse has this kind of taste. You market it. It's very tasty. If you get munchy, you can always eat your blouse. But you see, the oddity of this is we're not denying that her blouse is there over in physical space, that it is composed of atoms, but now its attributes all consist of immature qualities that don't exist in physical space. Report an error in the passage at 7:42
8:14 The texture of it, the smell of it, the taste of it, the look of it. And let's hear what sound it makes when we brush it. It makes it sound like that. Well, that's the sound it makes when you brush it. It also makes a sound. Report an error in the passage at 8:14
8:30 So we see by this arising of appearances, the conceptual mind comes out and it imputes an object that wasn't there and then imputes drawing from the palette of appearances. Which are non-physical and don't exist in physical space, draws from the palette of appearances and designates the object as having those various types of appearances as its attributes. Report an error in the passage at 8:30
8:57 Who's ever seen the object that has those attributes? Who's ever seen that? The smell I get, the taste I get, the feel of it I get, I can perceive that. But who's ever seen that which has, the sweater which bears those attributes? Who's ever found it? So the phrase in Dzogchen is Nang Lama Dupa. It appears, the sweater appears, but is not established, not to be found, it's not there. Report an error in the passage at 8:57
9:27 They even say Nang Xing Meba. The sweater appears, but it doesn't exist. Look for it, who's ever actually seen the sweater? The attribute bearer, that which is blue and has this texture and it has this taste and has this, has, has, has. Who's ever seen the haver? Out there. And so then when comes, To see that everything that we impute out there isn't out there at all. So let's check. Let's check. Back to meditation. Report an error in the passage at 9:27
· · · silence, 1 minute
11:02 As the Buddha stated, the mind that is established in equipoise comes to see reality as it is. So we do our very best to bring a balanced mind, neither lax nor agitated, calm Report an error in the passage at 11:02
11:21 and clear mind. So settle the body, speech and mind in the natural state. For just a minute or two, calm the mind with mindfulness of breathing. Report an error in the passage at 11:21
· · · silence, 3 minutes
14:22 Rest in this mode of awareness suggested by the Buddha to the wandering ascetic Bahiya. When he said in this scene, let there be just the scene, in the heard, just the heard, in the tactilely felt, just that which is tactilely felt, and then that which is mentally perceived, just the mentally perceived. Report an error in the passage at 14:22
14:44 In other words, rest in a mode of awareness that is nakedly attentive simply to the appearances arising from moment to moment by way of all of the six doors of perception. Report an error in the passage at 14:44
14:57 Always fresh. Do Report an error in the passage at 14:57
· · · silence, 2 minutes
16:56 not impede the activities of the conceptual mind. Allow them to flow, as in the practice of shamatha focused on the mind. Report an error in the passage at 16:56
17:08 Let concepts flow and observe the process of Report an error in the passage at 17:08
17:14 labeling, of designating, the sound of a bird, the feeling in your knee, Report an error in the passage at 17:14
17:25 color of the carpet. Report an error in the passage at 17:25
17:30 See how the mind imputes labels upon a basis of designation, upon appearances. That are not that which is labeled. The label is superimposed, the object itself is designated. Is that true or false? Examine closely how the conceptual mind literally conceives the world of objects, and for that matter, the world of subjects. Report an error in the passage at 17:30
· · · silence, 2 minutes
19:49 To rephrase, observe how it is that you have the experience of being in an environment populated by a myriad of objects, things. That bear attributes. How do these things come into existence? Report an error in the passage at 19:49
20:16 Or to present the hypothesis, how is it that the mind conceives, gives birth to, brings into existence a Report an error in the passage at 20:16
20:28 world of objects out there designated upon appearances that seem to be out there but are not? Report an error in the passage at 20:28
20:43 How do you bring the world into existence by the power of conceptual designation and labeling? Can you watch that happen? Report an error in the passage at 20:43
· · · silence, 2 minutes
22:56 Not only does the mind conceive of objects out there by conceptually designating them, the mind also conceives of oneself as a subject in here based upon appearances that are not I. Report an error in the passage at 22:56
23:15 The conceptual mind designates I and mine where there was no I or mine prior to the designation, a designation of a subject upon an empty appearance. Report an error in the passage at 23:15
23:36 Is that true or not? Examine how you conceive of yourself. The mind conceptually designates yourself as the subject, the observer, the thinker, the agent. Report an error in the passage at 23:36
· · · silence, 3 minutes
26:39 Mind designates an object as having certain appearances as its attributes. Report an error in the passage at 26:39
26:52 Can you ever actually identify the object that has those attributes, either among the appearances or apart from the appearances? Report an error in the passage at 26:52
27:05 Is that object anywhere to be found? Report an error in the passage at 27:05
· · · silence, 1 minute
28:28 Can you ever find any object out there or any subject in here, either among the appearances or separate from the appearances? Report an error in the passage at 28:28
28:48 When you seek to observe yourself, does anything appear other than appearances that are not yourself, that are empty? Examine closely. And Report an error in the passage at 28:48
· · · silence, 1 minute
29:51 if you cannot find the objects out there or the subject in here, might that be because they are unfindable? And have no existence whatsoever, apart from the mere nominal designation. They are nothing other than labels, words, with Report an error in the passage at 29:51
30:18 no independent referent anywhere. Is that the case? Examine closely. Report an error in the passage at 30:18
· · · silence, 5 minutes
35:24 So this type of Vipassanā meditation, this type of a remedial medication, so to speak, and that is if, like Dujum Lingba, as he narrated himself, if you've gained some clear insight, some real taste, A pristine awareness. And you're actually observing how appearances are arising from that dimension, not simply your substrate consciousness, but actually all appearances arising from this deepest ground awareness, indivisible from Dhammadattu. Report an error in the passage at 35:24
35:53 But then you fall back. As he said, something would come up and he'd fall back, right? Well, what's falling back? What's causing him to fall back? Reification. That's real simple. That's what makes him fall off the wagon and fall back into the addiction of... The deeply intensive habituation to reification. So if one gains a glimpse of Rigpa, some taste of Rigpa, how do you protect it? Report an error in the passage at 35:53
36:19 How do you avoid falling back into the same old rut? Well, you need to ward off that which will drag you back into the rut and that which drags you back in is reification. It's very similar, very, very similar to being in a non-lucid dream. And then something happening, you have a dream of doge tolu, or you see a pink elephant flying, whatever it is, you see some anomaly and you become lucid. Report an error in the passage at 36:19
36:43 And so you have suddenly this radical shift of perspective on the same dream, but you're seeing it in a radically different way. You become lucid, right? But it very often happens, especially for people who are just starting out, they're relative novices in lucid dreaming, that they're non-lucid, non-lucid, they snap into, they cut. Report an error in the passage at 36:43
37:01 They're now seeing the dream from a waking perspective and then something comes up and they lose their lucidity and they fall right back into a non-lucid dream, right back into the same rut. And how does that happen? Because they reify what's happening in the dream. And as soon as you reify whatever's happening in the dream, somebody out there or yourself as the dream persona being really over here, you've just lost lucidity and you've fallen back into the rut. Report an error in the passage at 37:01
37:25 So if you'd like to become lucid and stay lucid, you probably want to do some Vipassanā practice. So you don't fall back into the rut because you actually know that these appearances are empty and there's nothing out there from its own side and you're not over here from your own side. Now one brief point of clarification, because we do want to get back to the text quickly, when I stated something that is not disputed in the Madhyamaka, Prasangaka Madhyamaka, and that is that, go back to Angela's famous blouse, that it is composed of atoms, it's composed of fibers, somebody made it. Report an error in the passage at 37:25
37:58 It is located in physical space, it has a mass, it has location, it has some type of a gravitational field, at least on an atomic level. None of that's being disputed. So what the physicists say, the chemists say about the Blouse, the Madhyamaka, the Dzogchenbas are not refuting this. They say, yeah, you're right, you're right, yeah. But does this mean that those molecules, those atoms, the electromagnetic fields around the atoms, that they're really out there in objective space, really out there from their own side? Report an error in the passage at 37:58
38:26 No. Are they there? Yeah. In the same way that if you're dreaming of Angela being over there, she'd say, where is she? She's over there. She is over there. She's not over here. She's over there. The atoms are over there. Yes, the atoms that constitute, and the physical space in which those atoms are present, it's over there. But absolutely, inherently, from their own side? Report an error in the passage at 38:26
38:44 No. Then how can you say they're over there? Within the context of the conceptual framework of modern physics, modern physical understanding of the universe, there is such a thing as physical space, of course. It's not being refuted, it just doesn't exist inherently. And are there atoms? Yes. Atoms, particles, waves, fields, do they exist? Report an error in the passage at 38:44
39:06 Yes. By their own nature, were they simply discovered because they're already out there? No. Atoms, particles, fields, waves, they do exist relative to the mind that conceives them. And they have no existence whatsoever independent of the mind that conceives them. Just as colors have no existence whatsoever independent of visual perception, the colors that we see. Report an error in the passage at 39:06
39:31 And the sounds that we hear have no existence whatsoever, independent of auditory perception. But is it still valid to say, I heard a sound coming from over here? The answer is yes. Relative to perception and relative to conceptual designation. The conceptual designation arises relative to that which is designated, and that which is designated arises relative to the designating mind. Report an error in the passage at 39:31
39:55 They are mutually interdependent, take away one, the other one vanishes. That's a short introduction. Let's see what Jujum Lingba has to say. So with those words he became, okay, so to expand on this just a little, we pick up right where we left off with a few more minutes for the afternoon. To expand on this just a little, he's going to do this now analytically. We've had the chant and the juice was all there, but now he's going to do this analytically, set it out methodically. Report an error in the passage at 39:55
40:24 First of all, seek out the source of names. We just did that. Destroy grasping at the permanence of things. And collapse the false cave, which is primordially liberated within your own mind stream by knowing and realizing all of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. Okay, it's a big agenda, but he's going to do it in a very, very concise way. He has to, it's a very short text. So let's cover at least the first one. Seek out the source of names. Report an error in the passage at 40:24
40:54 When we heard people walking by during the meditation, we say, oh, there's a group of people walking by. We heard a helicopter go by. Ah, where'd that come from? Where's the source? And so on. By investigating and analyzing the tenacious grasping of saying the name I, which we use a lot every day when we're talking and have social intercourse, by investigating and analyzing the tenacious grasping involved in saying the name I and grasping at the thought I am, you find that the basis of designation of everything, including the flesh, blood and bones, Throughout the exterior and interior of the body and from the crown of the head down to the soles of the feet is non-objective and empty. Report an error in the passage at 40:54
41:39 So what is it? The basis of designation. That on which you are designating I and I am. Look at this whole field here. We're speaking now just for the time being physically. When you say I'm over here, I'm tall, I'm chubby, I'm this, I'm that. This is my hand, this is my knee, this is my stomach and so forth. Report an error in the passage at 41:39
42:00 So on what are we designating all this I and my, from the top to the bottom, interior and external, we find the basis of designation is not objective. It's not out there. It's not out there in physical space. The basis of designation is appearances and they are not objective. They arise in the space of your mind and they're empty. Report an error in the passage at 42:00
42:20 They're empty of that which you're imputing upon it. And that is whether it's flesh, your flesh is empty of you. There's nobody there. Your brain, how about that one? Is there a person inside the brain? How many of them, by the way? Is there a person, is there an eye inside the brain? Well, no, the brain is empty of a person. Report an error in the passage at 42:20
42:40 So, there we go. So it's non-objective, it's not really out there in physical space, that which the basis of designation, it's appearances. They're not objective as existing out there independent of the substrate, independent of the space of the mind, and they are empty of that which you're designating upon them. Report an error in the passage at 42:40
42:56 Then continue to expose the error. And that is the error, of course, of reification, by also seeking out each of the specific names of the head, feet, arms, joints and so on. This is a very short list here. He does it much more elaborately elsewhere. But the head, okay, head, there's a term, head, got it. So am I touching my head? Yes, I'm touching my head right now. What's the basis of the designation? Report an error in the passage at 42:56
43:19 Tactile sensations. Tactile sensations are not a head. They don't exist in objective reality. But on the basis of tactile sensations, I say I'm touching my head. But actually I'm not touching my head, I'm touching my hair. Hair is not a head. Hair is not a head. Hair is on top of the head. So every time you look, that which you're designating is never that which is the basis of designation. Report an error in the passage at 43:19
43:42 It's always something superimposed upon it. Report an error in the passage at 43:42
43:48 As for the way to investigate all manners of establishing names and conventions, just the way we talk, in the external environment. So he starts with your self. He's going from the inside out, which is classic procedure. If you'd like to understand emptiness, well start with, how about you? Because you're the center of everything in your world. And if you're delusional about the nature of your own self, your own identity, then you're just bound to be deluded about everything else. Report an error in the passage at 43:48
44:16 Because your core is rotten. Your core is delusional. So everything the delusional touches is bound to be infiltrated with that delusion. So you might want to get that straight. Who are you? And is that sense of I am, is it delusional or is it accurate? And then, when we're looking at base of designation, it's very easy to look at body, head, he's attractive, she's not, etc., etc., and then find, okay, how about for the body? Report an error in the passage at 44:16
44:41 And then we find the body itself or any part of the body. Every single time there's a label that's imputed upon something which is not equivalent to that which is labeled. And that which is labeled cannot be found from the side of the basis of designation. The basis of designation is empty of that which is labeled. Report an error in the passage at 44:41
45:01 Imputed object. But now we go out, we start from the nucleus, the self, we go to the body, empty, empty all the way through. And then we move out beyond the parameters of the skin. As for the way to investigate all manners of establishing names and conventions in the external environment, by seeking out the name house, for example, in terms of its exterior, interior, upper and lower areas and its clay, stones and so forth. Report an error in the passage at 45:01
45:32 Disappears by itself. If you're looking for the house in terms of any of the elements, it's again the outer walls, the interior, the second story, the first story and so forth, you look for the house in any of its constituent parts, nowhere to be found, nowhere to be found apart from those constituent parts, which would imply it's nowhere to be found at all. Report an error in the passage at 45:32
45:56 Which one, if one were not very insightful. That would lead to the silly notion that there is no house, because it's not to be found among its components, it's not to be found outside of components, it's not to be found everywhere, therefore there's no house. Well, that's silly. Why would anybody pay $200,000 for something that doesn't exist? That's really silly. I want to sell houses, that's the case. Report an error in the passage at 45:56
46:23 I've got a house right here if you'd like it. It's a million dollars though, it's very expensive. It's a transparent house. And so this is exactly the reasoning why it's absurd to say, The self doesn't exist, I don't exist. If you don't exist, then great, your body doesn't, your house doesn't, nothing exists for exactly the same reason. Report an error in the passage at 46:23
46:44 Things do exist nominally, but if you look for them from the inside, not to be found. So, when we're looking at the constituent parts of, let's say, a Tibetan house made of clay, stone, wood and so forth, earth, that is the clay, it becomes pottery. The clay that could become part of your house, it can also, of course, become, can transform into pottery. You can call it a pot. Earth now gets the label pot. Report an error in the passage at 46:44
47:11 Earth becomes pottery and the names of the upper and lower sections of the stones, the tops and bottoms of trees and so forth, naturally disappear from where they are. When you look for them, they're not to be found. And through transformation and modification, these things, Such as stones and trees, wood and so forth, these things become watermills, stoves, pillars and beams. But not because the watermill, stove, pillar and beam actually wasn't there and then came into existence from its own side. Report an error in the passage at 47:11
47:46 It wasn't there and then it is because it's designated. The power of designation brings things into existence. But it's not an objective process. Of something that is objectively not a water mill, all on its own transforming into a water mill. And that goes for atoms, particles, waves, galaxies and everything else. Report an error in the passage at 47:46
48:14 Water becomes tea, fire becomes the flame of a butter lamp, air becomes a gust in a bellows and so on. All by the power of conceptual designation, not objectively coming into existence. So Nagarjuna's analysis here, this tetralemma, the tetralemma, Report an error in the passage at 48:14
48:35 Flame of a butter lamp. If it's really there, does it really come into existence from something else that objectively transforms into butter lamp? Does the butter lamp actually give rise to itself? Is it self-generated? Does it really create itself? Is it generated from both or from nada? And the answer, of course, is none of the above because it doesn't really come into existence at all out there by its own nature. Report an error in the passage at 48:35
49:08 So the house, as I gave the example yesterday, a house burns down, happens, or it's crumbled by an earthquake, or a wrecking ball, houses are destroyed in myriad ways. Exactly at what point is the house no longer there? At what point is there's no house? With the first boom, as the wrecking ball is coming in, the second boom, the third boom, when it's complete rubble, is it gone yet? Report an error in the passage at 49:08
49:42 How thoroughly do you need to destroy it before the house is no longer there? And as we saw in the case of the couple who looked at their burned-down house, there are all kinds of houses. Some of them are burned-down houses, but they're still called houses in serious need of repair. Report an error in the passage at 49:42
50:06 And likewise, a house that is mashed down into sand by, you know, they did a lot of damage to my house. That's going to take a lot of repair work. But I can, I can fix it. Yeah? You haven't let it go. The designation is still there, and I'm just going to modify it so it fits more of my notion of a well-built house rather than a severely damaged house. Report an error in the passage at 50:06
50:34 It comes into existence when we designate it. It goes out of existence when we withdraw the designation. It doesn't happen objectively. Reveal the fallacy in each of these cases that the bases of designation, of such transformations of one thing turning into another, Of such transformations, cessations and disappearances cannot be ascertained. That is, if you're looking for it, to ascertain it objectively from its own side by its own nature. Report an error in the passage at 50:34
51:05 When does one thing transform into another? Exactly when did that happen? When does one thing cease? When does one thing disappear? When does one thing arise? All is unfindable. Unfindable. From its own side. So that's seeking out the source of names. It's very concise, very powerful. That's core Prasangaka Madhyamaka Vipassanā. Quite clearly, yeah? That's not even Svatantrika. It's not even Svatantrika. That's straight Prasangaka Madhyamaka. Report an error in the passage at 51:05
51:36 Pretty clear. Okay? Very good. Five o 'clock. See you at seven. Report an error in the passage at 51:36
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Talk by B. Alan Wallace. Original at Vajrayana Institute via Internet Archive: https://archive.org/details/Dzogchen_Retreat_2015. Licensed CC BY-NC-ND 3.0. Transcript generated automatically and may contain errors; the audio is the authoritative version.
Recorded at Vajrayana Institute, Sydney, and archived by the institute on Internet Archive. More from Vajrayana Institute