← Emily Hsu

Buddhist Psychology; Mind and Mental Process

Emily Hsu · 7 July 2006 · 1 h 11 min · Tse Chen Ling via Internet Archive


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Key passages

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  • 3:25

    that part of your consciousness that is aware of those sounds. your ear consciousness. is a direct perceiver.

  • 7:37

    So these conceptual minds are getting at their objects through an internal image, a mental image that's made up by our own minds, which is why all conceptual consciousnesses are mistaken. They're mistaken because conceptual consciousness gets at its object through a mental image and

  • 15:44

    So a correctly assuming consciousness is, for example, the knowledge that arises when something is explained to you. So if you're listening to a teaching and you believe what is being said, you've decided on that, then it's probably a correctly assuming consciousness. And it's just based on having heard something. Actually, there are five different types of correctly assuming consciousnesses.

  • 37:27

    the definition is a knower that is a common locus of having clear appearance of the specifically characterized phenomenon that is its object of engagement and being unable to induce ascertainment. With respect to the specifically characterized phenomenon that is its object of engagement. Okay, a nice long definition. Actually, before I get to the next slide. So it's a knower, right? Does everybody remember what a knower is? Right.

  • 57:19

    And it's unable to later induce a conceptual consciousness that would be able to tell what that object was or that one even saw the object. So just in summary, the characteristics. It's a consciousness or a knower. An awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained is a consciousness. And it's non-conceptual.

Transcript

0:24 it's okay. That's fine. All I need is another cushion. Report an error in the passage at 0:24

0:31 Welcome everyone. We have a big class today. We'll start with the meditation. Report an error in the passage at 0:31

1:02 So we'll just sit up straight and Report an error in the passage at 1:02

1:07 focus on our breath for a few minutes. Report an error in the passage at 1:07

· · · silence, 2 minutes

3:08 So now become aware of the sounds around you, the traffic outside, and Report an error in the passage at 3:08

3:25 that part of your consciousness that is aware of those sounds. your ear consciousness. Report an error in the passage at 3:25

3:58 is a direct perceiver. Report an error in the passage at 3:58

4:05 So Report an error in the passage at 4:05

· · · silence, 1 minute

4:37 notice how your ear consciousness gets at its objects, the sounds, directly. Any Report an error in the passage at 4:37

4:59 commentary we have about those sounds, such as maybe they're annoying or pleasant or whatever, those are conceptual consciousnesses. So Report an error in the passage at 4:59

· · · silence, 1 minute

6:07 notice that a conceptual consciousness... is looking at an internal image, an image in our own minds. It's Report an error in the passage at 6:07

6:25 not accessing its object directly like the ear consciousness. The Report an error in the passage at 6:25

6:42 conceptual consciousness has created an image in our minds. Any Report an error in the passage at 6:42

6:56 labeling of the sound is conceptual. Any judging of the sound is conceptual. Report an error in the passage at 6:56

7:07 Any thinking about the sound is conceptual. And Report an error in the passage at 7:07

7:15 any remembering of the sound is conceptual. Report an error in the passage at 7:15

7:37 So these conceptual minds are getting at their objects through an internal image, a mental image that's made up by our own minds, which Report an error in the passage at 7:37

7:55 is why all conceptual consciousnesses are mistaken. Report an error in the passage at 7:55

8:13 They're mistaken because conceptual consciousness gets at its object through a mental image and Report an error in the passage at 8:13

8:27 not directly. Report an error in the passage at 8:27

· · · silence, 1 minute

9:00 So see if you can notice in your own minds the difference between that direct perceiver, that your consciousness Report an error in the passage at 9:00

9:12 Okay, Report an error in the passage at 9:12

· · · silence, 2 minutes

11:11 now let's just try to develop a positive motivation thinking Report an error in the passage at 11:11

11:26 of all sentient beings around us who Report an error in the passage at 11:26

11:40 all want happiness, who Report an error in the passage at 11:40

11:49 are suffering again and again. So Report an error in the passage at 11:49

12:08 may we sit in this class in order to be as beneficial as we can for all sentient beings. object that accesses the object through a mental image. Report an error in the passage at 12:08

· · · silence, 4 minutes

12:52 Welcome to class 10. Report an error in the passage at 12:52

12:57 So we have a couple of new students today. So welcome. And, you know, it might be a bit confusing at first. And, you know, be patient because we've all gone through it. And it becomes more and more clear over time. Report an error in the passage at 12:57

13:16 Well, I certainly hope so. Report an error in the passage at 13:16

13:26 A review of the two types of awarenesses, or the two divisions of awarenesses in this text are valid cognizers and non-valid cognizers. Report an error in the passage at 13:26

13:36 We've already gone through the two types of valid cognizers, the direct valid cognizers and the inferential valid cognizers, and we also went through the subsequent cognizer and the correctly assuming consciousness. Report an error in the passage at 13:36

13:55 So today we'll cover the awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained. Report an error in the passage at 13:55

14:11 So currently we're covering non-valid consciousnesses. So just a review from last time we covered correctly assuming consciousnesses, which were the second type of non-valid consciousnesses. Report an error in the passage at 14:11

14:33 And just as a review, a non-valid consciousness is a knower that's not Newly incontrovertible. So it's not new in that it's not a fresh understanding. Report an error in the passage at 14:33

14:50 And it's not incontrovertible, which means that it's not a realizing consciousness. And that's according to this school, the Sautrantika school. Report an error in the passage at 14:50

15:17 So we'll do a little review of correctly assuming consciousnesses, which is, once again, the fourth of the seven types of awareness. So the primary focus of this class are the seven types of awarenesses or also sometimes called the seven ways of knowing. Report an error in the passage at 15:17

15:44 So a correctly assuming consciousness is, for example, the knowledge that arises when something is explained to you. So if you're listening to a teaching and you believe what is being said, you've decided on that, then it's probably a correctly assuming consciousness. Report an error in the passage at 15:44

16:11 And it's just based on having heard something. Actually, there are five different types of correctly assuming consciousnesses. But for example, if you just hear something and you believe it, then it's a correctly assuming consciousness. Report an error in the passage at 16:11

16:32 But then if you think about it, you reflect again and again on it, you Report an error in the passage at 16:32

16:39 finally actually realize it to be true based on a correct sign or a correct reason, then it becomes an inferential. So a correctly assuming consciousness is correct, but it's not a realizing consciousness. Report an error in the passage at 16:39

17:09 So here, this is from Mind in Tibetan Buddhism, this quote. But if you're still thinking about it and you are seeking to increase your understanding, then it's a correctly assuming consciousness. Report an error in the passage at 17:09

17:29 Carol, wait for the microphone. Report an error in the passage at 17:29

17:35 I just had a quick question regarding... When you said that it's based on something that's explained to you, or it could be, what if it isn't correct though? Does that negate it being a correctly assuming consciousness? Yeah, and we'll get to that. So this is just a general quote. Report an error in the passage at 17:35

18:05 But yeah, if you hear something, if someone explains something to you and it's correct and you believe it, then it's a correctly assuming consciousness. If it's incorrect, then it's wrong consciousness. That's a good question. And just to review, I won't go into detail in these definitions, but a review of two definitions of correctly assuming consciousness. Report an error in the passage at 18:05

18:30 The first one is the definition in our text. A factually concordant determinative knower that is controvertible with regard to determining its object. And the second definition was given in Lati Rinpoche's book, Mind and Tibetan Buddhism, which found a flaw in the first definition. And the key part of the second definition that points out the flaw of the first definition is that a correctly assuming consciousness needs to be A one-pointed mind in that it's a decisive mind. A doubting consciousness is considered a two-pointed mind because a doubting consciousness is wondering, for example, does the self exist or does it not exist? Report an error in the passage at 18:30

19:24 Does it exist or does it not exist? But a correctly assuming consciousness is a one-pointed mind in that it has decided. Report an error in the passage at 19:24

19:37 So the key characteristics of a correctly assuming consciousness. It is that it's correct, speaking to Carol's question, it is correct belief, which in the definition it said factually concordant. It's Report an error in the passage at 19:37

19:59 a decisive mind, which is what one-pointed means in the definition. Report an error in the passage at 19:59

20:08 It's not kind of wondering if it's correct or not, it's decided. Report an error in the passage at 20:08

20:19 It's controvertible, which means it's not a realization. Report an error in the passage at 20:19

20:27 So a realization... It's said to remove superimpositions or remove kind of misconceptions, something that we overlay onto something. A superimposition is overlaying something that doesn't exist onto something that does exist. Report an error in the passage at 20:27

20:50 So the big one we all have is overlaying inherent existence onto everything. Report an error in the passage at 20:50

21:01 when you realize... For example, that phenomena are empty. Then it removes a layer of misconceptions, a layer of misconceptions of inherent existence. Report an error in the passage at 21:01

21:15 So realization is in a way unshakable. Once you attain a realization, no one can convince you otherwise. Prior to that, a correctly assuming consciousness can easily turn into doubt. Report an error in the passage at 21:15

21:45 And then the last characteristic of a correctly assuming consciousness is that it's conceptual. So in the definition it says it's a determinative knower, which means that it determines its object, it kind of distinguishes objects, one object from another, which Report an error in the passage at 21:45

22:06 is the conceptual mind. Report an error in the passage at 22:06

22:21 Okay, I shared this quote last time as well. Just to emphasize that our correctly assuming consciousnesses or also translated as correct beliefs are very important along the spiritual path and they serve as a basis for getting inferential realizations. We first need to have a correctly assuming consciousness and then we meditate again and again and think about it again and again before it can become an inferential realization. Report an error in the passage at 22:21

22:49 So Report an error in the passage at 22:49

23:06 in this quote it says that for many of us Our faith in the existence of past and future lives, liberation, omniscience and emptiness. Our correct beliefs, our correctly assuming consciousnesses. Report an error in the passage at 23:06

23:28 So although it's controvertible or fallible, it's still beneficial and needs to be developed. Report an error in the passage at 23:28

23:41 And then just a review of the five divisions of correctly assuming consciousnesses. And I won't go into detail on these. Those that do not have a reason at all. Those that have a contradictory reason, those for which the reason is indefinite, those for which the reason is not established, and those for which a reason exists but is not settled. Report an error in the passage at 23:41

24:08 And Report an error in the passage at 24:08

24:14 which of these five serve as the basis for an inferential realization, kind of as a cause? Choki? The final one. Yeah. So those for which a reason exists but is not settled. Report an error in the passage at 24:14

24:33 So you've gone through all of the reasoning, the reasoning is all correct, but you just haven't realized it yet. Exactly. Report an error in the passage at 24:33

24:54 So just highlighting the differences between, this might not have been in last week's, between correctly assuming consciousnesses and inferential cognizers. Report an error in the passage at 24:54

25:06 So an inferential cognizer is firm and stable. So once something has been realized with inference, one will not change from, What one has ascertained as long as it is remembered. So it's firm and stable. An inferential cognizer is a realization. And Report an error in the passage at 25:06

25:36 I notice in my own experience, I have moments in which I really believe in certain aspects of the Dharma and moments where doubt comes up. So that's a good indication that I only have correctly assuming consciousnesses. But Report an error in the passage at 25:36

25:56 once it's realized inferentially. Then I wouldn't have this doubt arise ever. Okay, Report an error in the passage at 25:56

26:09 then in contrast, correctly assuming consciousnesses lack the stability. Report an error in the passage at 26:09

26:17 They're merely assertions and beliefs and so can easily change into doubt. So Report an error in the passage at 26:17

26:32 it says thus, correctly assuming consciousnesses lack the stability of inferential cognition from which one cannot be swayed no matter what anyone might say. Report an error in the passage at 26:32

26:46 So as Hillary was saying earlier, it's a lot of work to get from a correctly assuming consciousness to an inferential cognizer. Or maybe we say a lot of effort, joyous effort. Report an error in the passage at 26:46

27:05 Okay, so in this discussion group we reviewed the homework, but we'll do it again quickly for people who didn't go. So homework eight, number Report an error in the passage at 27:05

27:27 1A, correctly assuming consciousnesses are necessarily incontrovertible, yes or no? Report an error in the passage at 27:27

27:37 Excellent. No. Are they necessarily factually concordant? Yes. Are they necessarily conceptual? Yes. And are they necessarily non-mistaken? Excellent. Report an error in the passage at 27:37

27:56 Okay. Number two, which of the five divisions of correctly assuming consciousness is an awareness that believes the self is impermanent because it exists? Report an error in the passage at 27:56

28:21 CR. Why is it a CR? Report an error in the passage at 28:21

28:36 CR, because the self doesn't exist, so that's wrong, but... Yeah, and I think I confused people in this homework. So I'm talking here about the conventionally existent self, so actually a self that does exist, okay, because in general there's a self that exists and a self that doesn't exist. Report an error in the passage at 28:36

29:09 The self that doesn't exist is the inherently existent self. But then there's also the conventionally existent self, the mere I. So here I'm just talking about the mere. Report an error in the passage at 29:09

29:22 So then what is the answer Report an error in the passage at 29:22

29:32 for the audience? I put it's Report an error in the passage at 29:32

29:42 no pervasion. Awareness of beliefs is self is impermanent because it exists. Report an error in the passage at 29:42

29:56 Just because something exists, it's not necessarily impermanent. For instance, space. Exactly. Right. Report an error in the passage at 29:56

30:08 So if it exists, it's not necessarily impermanent. Report an error in the passage at 30:08

30:15 Okay, B. An awareness that believes that the self is impermanent because it is produced from causes and conditions but has not yet realized it incontrovertibly. It Report an error in the passage at 30:15

30:39 wasn't at the group. Yeah. We just keep calling on David. Katie, you want to try? Yeah, all right. Report an error in the passage at 30:39

30:48 She's cheating. We should put a little block. Report an error in the passage at 30:48

30:56 So you're saying it's a reason that is not settled, or the reason is established, or the reason exists but is not settled. Report an error in the passage at 30:56

31:06 that would be the last one. Report an error in the passage at 31:06

31:10 Are you going to ask her why? You're going to let her get away with that? It's her first class. She's tough. Report an error in the passage at 31:10

31:22 sorry, you're talking to me. Yeah. She's an artist. She can take it. I'll wait until next time. I agree. Okay, what about C? An awareness that wonders if the self is impermanent but thinks that it probably is. I Report an error in the passage at 31:22

31:43 saw no movement back there. Report an error in the passage at 31:43

31:50 I put no and none of the above because if it's wondering and it thinks it probably is, it's... Report an error in the passage at 31:50

· · · silence, 1 minute

32:01 A doubting consciousness. It's two-pointed. Report an error in the passage at 32:01

32:13 Okay, Report an error in the passage at 32:13

32:22 so what about D? An awareness that believes that the self is impermanent because it is not produced by causes and conditions. Report an error in the passage at 32:22

32:39 Anybody? Okay, Report an error in the passage at 32:39

32:46 well we just went through this in discussion group. Choki? Report an error in the passage at 32:46

32:55 It's actually, oh, I'm still getting it. Sorry. I actually have two answers for that. It's a contradictory reason because the self being impermanent is because it's produced by causes and conditions, not because it's not produced by causes and conditions, so it's a contradictory reason. But also the reason is not established. The reason does not go with the subject. Report an error in the passage at 32:55

33:27 I don't know what the right word, the verb is there. Anyway, those are my two. You can say apply. Apply to, yeah. So what's the reason? The reason is because it is not produced by causes and conditions. And that doesn't apply to the subject. Subject is self. Okay, Report an error in the passage at 33:27

33:48 what about E? Awareness that believes that the self is permanent because it is produced by causes and conditions. Is this loud enough? Yeah. Okay. Report an error in the passage at 33:48

34:09 The awareness that believes that the self is permanent because it is produced by causes and conditions. Report an error in the passage at 34:09

34:37 consciousness. Yeah, good. Excellent. Report an error in the passage at 34:37

34:43 Right, so it's not factually concordant. Report an error in the passage at 34:43

34:47 Okay, number three. What is the pervasion between correctly assuming consciousness and conceptual consciousness? Report an error in the passage at 34:47

34:58 David, do you want to answer that one? Four possibilities? Report an error in the passage at 34:58

35:19 Four possibilities? Okay, four possibilities. So if it's a correctly assuming consciousness, it's not necessarily conceptual consciousness? Yes, it is. Report an error in the passage at 35:19

35:29 Okay, so what are the four possibilities then? Three possibilities. Okay. Possibilities. Report an error in the passage at 35:29

35:44 Okay, so if it's a correctly assuming consciousness, it's necessarily a conceptual consciousness. But if it's a conceptual consciousness, it's not necessarily a conceptual consciousness. Report an error in the passage at 35:44

35:59 Hello, Report an error in the passage at 35:59

36:11 hello? Oh, that's better. Okay. Yeah, Report an error in the passage at 36:11

36:19 yeah. Okay, so the answer to number three was three possibilities. Okay, great. Any questions on that? Report an error in the passage at 36:19

36:35 Okay, we'll move on. Report an error in the passage at 36:35

36:39 To awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained. This is also translated sometimes as inattentive awareness or inattentive perception or non-ascertaining consciousnesses. But this is actually really technically correct, an awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained. And it's the fifth of the seven types of awareness. Report an error in the passage at 36:39

37:19 Okay, so the definition, we're going to go through this definition kind of in a lot of detail. So the definition is a knower that is a common locus of having clear appearance of the specifically characterized phenomenon that is its object of engagement and being unable to induce ascertainment. With respect to the specifically characterized phenomenon that is its object of engagement. Okay, a nice long definition. Report an error in the passage at 37:19

38:04 Actually, before I get to the next slide. So it's a knower, right? Does everybody remember what a knower is? Right. Yeah, excellent. A consciousness or an awareness, right? So it could be conceptual or non-conceptual, a knower. Does everybody remember what common locus is? Report an error in the passage at 38:04

38:30 The common point between the two, right? So actually, so an awareness to which an object appears but without being ascertained necessarily is both of these two, having clear appearance and unable to induce ascertainment. Report an error in the passage at 38:30

38:53 Okay, what does clear appearance mean? We saw this one other time. So a clear appearance refers to a non-conceptual consciousnesses. So only non-conceptual consciousnesses. said to have clear appearance. Okay, Report an error in the passage at 38:53

39:22 so this gives us a clue that an awareness to which an object appears without being ascertained is a non-conceptual mind, right? Report an error in the passage at 39:22

39:38 A knower in general can be conceptual, right? Can be conceptual or non-conceptual, but this awareness is non-conceptual, okay? because conceptual consciousnesses, right, access their objects through a mental image. Report an error in the passage at 39:38

39:18 they don't have clear appearance. Report an error in the passage at 39:18

· · · silence, 1 minute

39:52 So then what is a specifically characterized phenomenon? And if people remember from way back, there was a list of, in collected topics, a list of existence, permanent phenomena, impermanent phenomena, and what are mutually inclusive with each of those. Report an error in the passage at 39:52

40:15 And specifically characterized phenomena for Sautrantika is mutually inclusive with impermanent phenomena. Report an error in the passage at 40:15

40:30 So according to different schools, specifically characterized phenomena are posited differently, but according to Sotrantika, which is what we're studying, they posit as a phenomenon which is established by way of its own character without being merely imputed by a term or a thought consciousness. Report an error in the passage at 40:30

40:55 So obviously this isn't in accordance with Prasangika, because Prasangika says that Nothing is established by way of its own character. But it's basically saying that for... Actually, let me read something for you. Report an error in the passage at 40:55

41:19 So in general, there are what we call specifically characterized phenomena and generally characterized phenomena. So specifically characterized phenomena are impermanent phenomena. And generally characterized phenomena are permanent phenomena. Report an error in the passage at 41:19

41:41 So the distinction between generally and specifically characterized phenomena turns on whether or not the phenomena must be understood by a thought consciousness. Report an error in the passage at 41:41

41:55 So specifically characterized phenomena or impermanent phenomena are, for example, the objects of our senses. Everything that we can see in this room, everything that we can hear, touch, these are all impermanent phenomena. These are all specifically characterized phenomena. We don't need a thought consciousness to access the object. But something like emptiness. Report an error in the passage at 41:55

42:25 Emptiness we can't see or touch or hear. We need a thought consciousness or a conceptual consciousness to arrive at emptiness. We need to think about emptiness. We can't directly perceive emptiness with our... Report an error in the passage at 42:25

42:48 So Report an error in the passage at 42:48

42:52 it says that all permanent phenomena need a conceptual consciousness to access it. Report an error in the passage at 42:52

43:11 But in this definition, basically it's just saying that we have a clear appearance or a direct perception of an impermanent phenomenon. And Report an error in the passage at 43:11

43:30 we'll go into examples later which will clarify all of this. Report an error in the passage at 43:30

43:37 That is, it's object of engagement. Does everybody remember what an object of engagement is? Report an error in the passage at 43:37

43:53 Remember, it's the object that the mind actually engages. People remember this chart. Report an error in the passage at 43:53

44:05 Remember there were three types of objects. The object of engagement, the appearing object and the determined object. The last column, the determined object only applies to conceptual consciousnesses. Report an error in the passage at 44:05

44:23 So for example, an eye consciousness apprehending blue, the object of engagement is blue. And the appearing object is blue. Report an error in the passage at 44:23

44:33 But for a conceptual consciousness like the conception of a pen, the object of engagement is the pen and the appearing object is a mental image of the pen. Report an error in the passage at 44:33

44:49 So the appearing object is what actually appears to that consciousness. And then the last two examples are examples of wrong consciousnesses. Report an error in the passage at 44:49

45:00 An eye consciousness that apprehends one moon as two. Let's say if you've had a little bit too much to drink. Report an error in the passage at 45:00

45:10 So the object of engagement for a wrong consciousness is always something that doesn't exist. So in this case it would be two moons. Report an error in the passage at 45:10

45:25 Well, it said the appearing object would be a single moon. Report an error in the passage at 45:25

45:33 So back to the definition right here, why it says object of engagement as opposed to object. It's basically saying that the object of engagement needs to be something that exists. Report an error in the passage at 45:33

45:51 And it needs to be something that's impermanent. Report an error in the passage at 45:51

45:57 So it can't be a wrong consciousness, right? An awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained needs to be something where the object of engagement exists and is impermanent. And Report an error in the passage at 45:57

46:28 we'll go through examples. Report an error in the passage at 46:28

46:35 And then another characteristic is that it's unable to induce ascertainment. Report an error in the passage at 46:35

46:46 for example... Report an error in the passage at 46:46

46:50 driving, we're driving down. You know, the street and we're thinking about something, we're absorbed in our thought and we run the stop sign. Report an error in the passage at 46:50

47:07 So that consciousness was, right, our minds were very focused on our thoughts and the stop sign appeared to our eye consciousness. Report an error in the passage at 47:07

47:21 But we wouldn't be able to induce an ascertainment or... If somebody asked us, you know, was there, did you see a stop sign, we would say no. Report an error in the passage at 47:21

47:37 Yeah, you know, I tend to think that, yeah, all traffic accidents are due to these, right? Because we're not paying attention, right? We're not paying attention to the car stopped in front of us or the stop sign or, you know, whatever. Report an error in the passage at 47:37

47:59 Yeah, Jeanette. But what determines whether or not The thing appears, like the stop sign. How do we know whether or not it appeared or not if we didn't see it or if we don't ascertain it? Report an error in the passage at 47:59

48:22 Well, that's a good question. What do you think? Report an error in the passage at 48:22

48:36 Depends if there's a tree or not blocking the sign. Report an error in the passage at 48:36

48:44 Hillary seems to want to say something. Yes. sign. Report an error in the passage at 48:44

48:50 Since I'm usually a passenger in her car, I could witness. I could be the witness, as well as the policeman, that the sign was there. Maybe, in other words, maybe other correct, valid... I don't know whether... But seriously, like other people or other consciousnesses... Report an error in the passage at 48:50

49:21 Does that have a bearing on it? I mean it's a manifest object, right? So if there's other, would they have to be valid consciousnesses, other conventionally valid consciousnesses? I don't know. See the thing. I mean Report an error in the passage at 49:21

49:44 this is class 10 and I've missed everything else but I have had experiences since I've been driving in this country where in Australia the stop signs are on the left hand side of the road. Report an error in the passage at 49:44

49:55 So Sometimes I'm used to seeing them there, except in America they're on the right-hand side of the road, and sometimes I'll have gone across a street and realised as I've gone across that I've run a stop sign. So what's happened is my eye consciousness has perceived a stop sign, but it's blurred it into the background images of the trees and the houses as something that's not terribly relevant to me right now. Report an error in the passage at 49:55

50:23 And then as I've gone across... You know, 30 seconds later, I'm like, oh, I should have stopped. So how would that be? How would you describe that? Because it's kind of not, you've kind of cognized it, but it's not really kind of, you've not cognized it enough for it to have an impact on how your body follows through your actions. Report an error in the passage at 50:23

50:48 Okay. Is what I'm saying making sense? Yeah. Yeah, okay. Before I get to that, let's go back to Janet's question. And Janet's question, I think that's a good thing to cook, to think about it. I think Hillary has a good point. Yeah, Report an error in the passage at 50:48

51:14 because if the stop sign doesn't exist at all, right, then you wouldn't say that it appears. Report an error in the passage at 51:14

51:22 And if your eyes were closed, you probably wouldn't say that appears either. No, I think Hillary's point is good because if you think about this room and the people in this room, there's many things appearing and many things are appearing to one person that aren't appearing right now to me and vice versa. Report an error in the passage at 51:22

51:43 So that would be kind of along the lines of what Hillary says. It seems to me to make a lot of sense. Yeah, and usually a lot of things are appearing to us, but we're usually focused on one thing. Report an error in the passage at 51:43

52:02 So when you're looking up here, the tanka is also appearing to you, but you wouldn't be able to say, okay, well, what that tanka was. You wouldn't be able to describe that in detail unless you actually look at the tanka. So a lot of things are appearing to us, and usually we're focused on one thing. Report an error in the passage at 52:02

52:22 Yeah, Carol. But would the basis be perhaps what a valid cognizer would see or what would appear to a valid cognizer if there were a valid cognizer in this or a direct perceiver is what I really mean. I mean, is there sort of a basis of what exists within the context of not false objects? I mean, we talk about The horns of a rabbit are things that don't exist, but we can talk about, I mean there is some basis of what conventionally exists in this room, even though we might not all apprehend it at a given time or even after a long time. Report an error in the passage at 52:22

53:12 Yeah, exactly. And we've talked about this before, but the criteria for whether or not something Conventionally exists, or exists at all, because if it exists then it must exist conventionally. It needs to be in accordance with worldly renown, and it needs to be not contradicted, like Hillary was saying, by a conventional valid cognizer, and also not be contradicted by an ultimate valid cognizer, or a valid cognizer that's perceiving ultimate truth. Report an error in the passage at 53:12

53:57 So let's just go through, before I get back to Katie's question, let's go through what this unable to induce ascertainment means. Report an error in the passage at 53:57

54:08 So it means that this knower is unable later to induce an ascertaining consciousness which knows that one saw the object. So if you've gone through the stop sign and you get pulled over by the police, and the police ask you if you even saw a stop sign, if you say no, Then it's an awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained. Later on you wouldn't even know that that stop sign appeared to you. Report an error in the passage at 54:08

54:42 But if you kind of vaguely knew that the stop sign was there but you just didn't register, then I would say it's not an awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained. Because you would later be able to say, oh yeah, there was a stop sign there. Janet. Report an error in the passage at 54:42

55:03 If you were, like say the stop sign was there and you didn't ascertain it, the policeman asked you and you said, no, I didn't see it, because maybe you were looking a different direction, like maybe you turned your head this way and the sign was over here. Report an error in the passage at 55:03

55:23 Is that also the same? same appears but it's not ascertained or do you say in that case since you're not looking in that direction it doesn't appear Report an error in the passage at 55:23

55:37 Yeah, if it's not in your field of vision at all, I would say it's not even appearing. If you're very absorbed in a conversation with somebody and let's say Michelle walks by and you're vaguely aware that somebody walked by. But then somebody's looking for Michelle and says, you know, did Michelle come by? You wouldn't be able to say, right? Maybe she did, maybe she didn't, right? Report an error in the passage at 55:37

56:14 So that would be an example of an awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained. You wouldn't be able to tell later what that object was. Maybe you're aware that there was an object, but you wouldn't be able to... So, unable to induce ascertainment means that this knower is unable later to induce an ascertaining consciousness, which knows that one saw the object. Report an error in the passage at 56:14

56:55 And an ascertaining consciousness is necessarily a conceptual mind. Right. there Report an error in the passage at 56:55

57:07 This awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained is a non-conceptual mind. For example, a sense consciousness. Report an error in the passage at 57:07

57:19 And it's unable to later induce a conceptual consciousness that would be able to tell what that object was or that one even saw the object. Report an error in the passage at 57:19

57:48 So just in summary, the characteristics. It's a consciousness or a knower. An awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained is a consciousness. And it's non-conceptual. Report an error in the passage at 57:48

58:08 Its object of engagement exists and is an impermanent phenomenon. And Report an error in the passage at 58:08

58:20 it is unable later to induce an ascertaining consciousness which knows that one perceived the object. Report an error in the passage at 58:20

58:44 So in general, these awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained, there are positive uses to these awarenesses. Not so positive uses. If we're just not paying attention and get in a traffic accident, maybe that's a not so positive use. Report an error in the passage at 58:44

59:06 But we also use these, for example, when we're trying to concentrate. We're really trying to concentrate on a particular object, on a teaching or reading something or meditating. And there we're deliberately actually cultivating these, right? We're very focused on an object, so everything else that appears is not being ascertained. Report an error in the passage at 59:06

59:37 Anna, do you want to get the mic? Report an error in the passage at 59:37

59:45 Well, the wording, specifically characterized phenomena, shouldn't that be a sense? Sense phenomena? Because we start with a sense consciousness, right? Well, a specifically characterized phenomena is anything that's impermanent. So it's not necessarily... But it has to be using your senses, sight, smell, touch, taste. Report an error in the passage at 59:45

1:00:18 I mean, in general, most impermanent phenomena are objects of the senses. But an example of an impermanent phenomenon that's not an object of the senses, I mean, technically, is, for example, person or consciousness. Report an error in the passage at 1:00:18

1:00:40 Like a person has a body and has a mind. So the body of the person is the object of a sense consciousness, but a person itself is not an object of a sense consciousness. Report an error in the passage at 1:00:40

1:00:58 So it doesn't have to, so a specifically characterized phenomenon doesn't have to be an object of the senses. It just needs to be an impermanent phenomenon. Report an error in the passage at 1:00:58

1:01:13 You would relate to it, one would relate to it from one's sense conscious. Report an error in the passage at 1:01:13

1:01:21 Well, I think all of our conceptions and perceptions are based on some level on our sense experiences until you get further along the path, I think. Report an error in the passage at 1:01:21

1:01:42 Well, it just seems that you go... From sense consciousness then to conceptual when you're unable to induce ascertainment because the awareness came through a sense conscious and then later when you're trying to ascertain you go into a conceptual mode. Report an error in the passage at 1:01:42

1:02:05 So it's like a two-step process. Yeah, exactly. It is a two-step process. We have a non-conceptual mind that's not, well, That's maybe not paying attention. And later on it's not able to induce a conceptual consciousness that knows what appeared. So it is a two-step process. Report an error in the passage at 1:02:05

1:02:47 So some examples or illustrations of awarenesses to which an object appears without being ascertained are, for example, a sense-direct perceiver apprehending blue that induces the doubt that wonders, did I see blue or not? So that's the one we've been talking about, right? A sense direct perceiver that induces the doubt, that wonders whether or not you saw the object or heard the object or whatever. Report an error in the passage at 1:02:47

1:03:19 The second illustration is a mental direct perceiver in the continuum of an ordinary being that apprehends the five sense objects. Report an error in the passage at 1:03:19

1:03:31 So if we remember correctly, mental direct perceivers There were two types of mental direct perceivers. One of them was a clairvoyance, which most of us don't have. And the second one is that one moment of mental direct perception at the end of the continuum of a sense consciousness and before the conceptual consciousness kicks in. Report an error in the passage at 1:03:31

1:04:05 Just that one moment, that one... One sixty-fifth of a finger snap. is too short for ordinary beings to... So that is a mental direct perceiver that is an awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained because it's too short. And Report an error in the passage at 1:04:05

1:04:44 then the third type are the self knowers that experience that single moment of mental direct perception are also said to be an awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained. Report an error in the passage at 1:04:44

1:05:16 Yeah, good memory. Right, exactly. Mental direct perceivers are other knowers. They know something other than one's own consciousness. Self-knowers know one's own consciousness. Report an error in the passage at 1:05:16

1:05:44 So once again, self-knowers are only posited by some of the schools and Prasangika doesn't posit self-knowers. Report an error in the passage at 1:05:44

1:06:03 Okay, so I found this in a book of how we can use these in our practice. So we kind of talked about this already where we deliberately cultivate these during meditation by focusing on the object of meditation and not on distracting objects. So if we're, let's say, trying to cultivate shiné, we're focusing on a particular object. Report an error in the passage at 1:06:03

1:06:37 And all of the sounds that arise, you know, we don't want to pay attention to them. We just allow them to arise and fall and not be distracted by them. And Report an error in the passage at 1:06:37

1:06:54 our thoughts too, we don't want. Exactly. Report an error in the passage at 1:06:54

1:07:02 And the second one I thought was kind of interesting in terms of objects that we have strong attachment or aversion to. Report an error in the passage at 1:07:02

1:07:15 In this book it was saying that we should try to cultivate these kind of non-ascertaining consciousnesses in association with these objects. So if there's someone that you really don't like, to not pay attention to that so much. Because it's when we think about them again and again and again, then that's when more and more afflictions arise. We become, you know, how this person said this to you and how that wasn't fair. Report an error in the passage at 1:07:15

1:07:51 And the more we go through that in our minds, the more angry we get or irritated we get. And then similarly with objects of strong attachment, we build stories around these objects. objects or these people or whatever, you know, our homes or our partners or whatever. And the more and more we create these stories in our minds, the more we generate. Report an error in the passage at 1:07:51

1:08:22 So I just thought that was kind of interesting and wanted to put that You could be Report an error in the passage at 1:08:22

1:09:10 aware of everything. Report an error in the passage at 1:09:10

1:09:13 Exactly. Yeah, I mean, that's a good point. I mean, Buddhists, right? Yeah. Report an error in the passage at 1:09:13

1:09:27 That's all. Just, you know, it seems like usually the logical way is to focus on single-pointed attention to a single object or, yeah, without paying attention to what you're not noticing, so to speak, for most of our busy minds. Report an error in the passage at 1:09:27

1:09:55 Yeah. I mean, when we're along the path, we need to deliberately cultivate this concentration and kind of tune out other objects. But yeah, once you become a Buddha, you don't have any of these awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained. Because a Buddha necessarily realizes everything. Report an error in the passage at 1:09:55

1:10:18 And there are some practices in which we're trying to cultivate awareness. And then there are practices in which we're trying to really focus on one object. Report an error in the passage at 1:10:18

1:10:30 But ultimately we'll get to the point where we can realize everything. Report an error in the passage at 1:10:30

1:10:41 Does anybody need to take a quick restroom break? Anything? Okay, well why don't we take five minutes. Report an error in the passage at 1:10:41

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Talk by Emily Hsu, recorded 7 July 2006. Original at Tse Chen Ling Center for Tibetan Buddhist Studies via Internet Archive: https://archive.org/details/Tse_Chen_Ling_Emily_Hsu_Mind_Mental_Process_20060707. Licensed Public Domain (CC). Transcript generated automatically and may contain errors; the audio is the authoritative version.

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